Asset Pricing Theory · AI · Mathematics · Theoretical Physics
A price is a claim about the future that somebody was willing to fund.
Most of my work asks what can be known about such claims: whether a model
that earns is a model that explains, where compensation for risk ends and
compensation for absorbing other people’s constraints begins, and why the
part of the cross-section that pays is so often the part nobody can name.
These are one question approached from two sides. Performance and
identification are governed by the same covariance spectrum, and they are
complementary rather than aligned: a high-Sharpe stochastic discount
factor need not identify priced risk, and the alpha tends to live in the
statistically unnameable bulk, at a floor set by statistical power rather
than by anyone’s skill.
That pushes outward rather than inward — toward who is on the other side
of a trade and what they are solving for, toward markets as aggregation
mechanisms that sometimes aggregate belief and sometimes only aggregate
attention, and toward the possibility that the discretionary–quantitative
divide is not a matter of technique but of what a person is willing to
accept as warrant for a belief.
Separately, and for its own sake, I work in geometric topology and
algebraic geometry — four-manifolds and instanton Floer theory, mirror
symmetry, and the geometry of toric Fano varieties and Calabi–Yau
threefolds — and on black hole information, where the same random-matrix
universality that governs high-dimensional return panels reappears in the
Page curve. A newer strand asks what large-scale artificial intelligence
does to markets, institutions, and the balance of power between states.
Day to day, I run the systematic investing business at one of the
world’s largest asset managers.
Asset pricing theory — stochastic discount factors and the statistics of high-dimensional return panels; the spectral structure of the cross-section, and whether a high-Sharpe model identifies priced risk or only describes it; the equilibrium level of factor compensation; information-theoretic foundations, from Kelly and Grinold to portfolios as codes; the demand side — inelastic markets, intermediary capital, who is on the other side; and how factors are born, crowd, and decay.
AI and the machine economy — institutional cognition as competitive advantage, prediction markets as informational infrastructure, and what disciplined discovery looks like once hypotheses are free and only validation is scarce.
Geometric topology — exotic smooth structures on four-manifolds, instanton knot homology and the Atiyah–Floer program, and turning classical existence questions into finite, machine-certified computations.
Gauge theory and moduli theory — Donaldson and Seiberg–Witten invariants, and the architecture beneath them: when the passage from an equation to a moduli space to a compactification to an algebra can be run in reverse.
Algebraic geometry — mirror symmetry, slope stability of tangent bundles on toric Fano varieties, deformations and smoothability of Calabi–Yau threefolds, and open FJRW theory.
Theoretical physics — quantum gravity, holography, black hole thermodynamics and the information paradox, quantum information, random-matrix theory and free probability, critical phenomena and universality.
International relations — how large-scale AI deployment re-centres physical constraint as a source of power, and how delegating decisions to machines erodes deterrence by blurring authorship and intent.
The AI-Native Asset Manager: Institutional Cognition as Competitive AdvantageAs frontier AI commoditizes information and analysis, the scarce resource shifts from intelligence to institutional epistemology — the architecture by which a firm generates, challenges, sizes, and learns from its investment beliefs. Returns decompose into narrative beta, cross-sectional factor alpha, and idiosyncratic issuer alpha, each demanding a different way of knowing, and the durable advantage proves to be a velocity rather than a position. SSRN, April 2026
An exotic S²×S² and an exotic ℂP²#ℂ̄P²Upgrading Lidman–Piccirillo’s slicing-distinguished four-manifold pair from equal cohomology rings to homeomorphic is equivalent to producing an exotic S²×S². The paper closes that gate by proving π₁ = 1 for one explicitly parametrized piece, via coset enumeration and Knuth–Bendix completion with complete certificates. arXiv:2608.17267 · scripts and certificates
Smoothability of Calabi–Yau threefoldsA five-paper series on when a singular Calabi–Yau threefold admits a smoothing, in Batyrev's setting of anticanonical hypersurfaces in Gorenstein toric Fano fourfolds. A sweep of the full Kreuzer–Skarke classification finds that 8.27% of all 473,800,776 reflexive four-polytopes carry a non-smoothable face, and that exactly 590 leave both the threefold and its Batyrev mirror isolated-singular — among them a unique mirror pair which a vanishing-cycle obstruction then proves non-smoothable on both sides, one for local and one for global reasons. In the positive direction, an explicit deformation of the ambient toric pair smooths what can be smoothed, and a combinatorial locking condition on a facet says when that mechanism cannot reach a germ at any degree. The two halves meet at first order; what separates them is integrability. Papers in preparation · code, data, and the five papers
The central-charge threshold for wall-crossing in two-variable open FJRW theoryThe open FJRW invariants of xʳ + yˢ are canonical — no primary wall-crossing — exactly when the central charge falls below one, which is to say exactly for the simple singularities A, D₄, E₆ and E₈. The first walls of every non-simple pair are classified, and each wall-crossing generator is identified as a Hamiltonian vector field.
Theoretical physics
The Page Curve Through the Transition: Testing the Diagonal Approximation Against the Exact Replica SpectrumBoth sides of the diagonal approximation are computable in the west-coast model, so this computes them. It reproduces the shape of the broadened crossover to about one per cent of the curve’s amplitude but overstates the entropy deficit at the transition by roughly ten per cent, and summing all non-crossing permutations rather than the two dominant saddles yields a Marchenko–Pastur law for the radiation spectrum. SSRN, March 2026
The Page Curve in Higher Dimensions: Phase Transitions, Critical Phenomena, and Universal BroadeningThe width of the Page transition is set by the square root of the heat capacity — a result derived away from criticality, which an AdS black hole violates, since it has a phase diagram. The width proves independent of spacetime dimension for large Schwarzschild–AdS, is parametrically enhanced near the Hawking–Page transition, and diverges with a different exponent at the Reissner–Nordström critical point — so the broadening discriminates between the two transitions. SSRN, March 2026
The Page Curve is not Enough: Universality, Ensemble Dependence, and Microscopic Ambiguity in Black Hole Information RecoveryReproducing a Page curve does not identify the microscopic resolution of the information paradox. A four-level universality hierarchy separates what is forced from what is diagnostic: any two scrambling dynamics forming approximate unitary designs with matching thermodynamics agree on everything through level three, so fuzzballs, islands, random unitary evolution, state-dependent interiors and ER=EPR are indistinguishable there and diverge only at the fine-grained fourth level. SSRN, April 2026
Informational Singularities and the Completion of Gravity: Replica Wormholes, Indeterminism, and Cosmic CensorshipReplica wormholes restore a coherent map from initial to final states without removing any curvature singularity — informational completion without geometric completion. Making that distinction precise yields the notion of an informational singularity, logically independent of the geometric one and coming apart from it in both directions, and motivates recasting strong cosmic censorship as a claim about coherent state maps rather than about Cauchy horizons. SSRN, August 2026
AI and the machine economy
Prediction Markets as the Informational Substrate of the Machine EconomyThe three institutional gaps blocking autonomous machine-to-machine commerce — adjudication, reputation, and liability — share one root: there is no market price for agent performance risk, deliverable quality, or failure correlation. Five prediction-market mechanisms are designed to supply those signals, with the instrument delimited as carefully as it is developed: an informational deficit can be priced, but a primitive needing an agreed vocabulary rather than a resolving fact needs coordination instead. SSRN, April 2026
The Institutional Plumbing for a Machine Economy: A Readiness Assessment of Building Blocks, Missing Infrastructure, and Commercial OpportunitiesSoftware agents can now pay, but paying is not economic agency: open exchange between agents with no prior relationship also needs identity, delegated authority, bonding, verification, adjudication, settlement, portable reputation, and somewhere for residual loss to land. Auditing that stack against what actually shipped through 2026 — where roughly two-thirds of settlements moved inside linked clusters and a fifth were fictitious — gives the conclusion that machine commerce expands along a verification-and-risk frontier, not a payment frontier. SSRN, March 2026
International relations and politics
Material Deployment Power in the Age of Artificial Intelligence: How Physical Constraints Reshape International OrderPrevailing accounts treat AI as an informational technology; deployment at scale instead re-centres physical constraint, since it depends on energy, transmission, cooling, and critical materials that expand slowly and unevenly. The paper defines material deployment power — the capacity to mobilize those physical systems under rivalry — and shows it shapes trade policy and alliance behaviour independently of innovation leadership. SSRN, April 2026
Algorithmic Plausible Deniability: The Structural Erosion of Deterrence in the Age of Artificial IntelligenceDelegating decisions to machines generates persistent uncertainty over authorship and intent, weakening deterrence even between rational states that prefer stability; unlike strategic ambiguity it is not chosen, but emerges from the delegation itself. The effects are asymmetric — hostile acts become more deniable while signals of restraint become less credible, which undermines escalation control. SSRN, April 2026